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SANCTIONS AND THE
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES:
FOCUS ON THE JAEA'
STEPHEN GOROVE*
NTERNATIONAL CONTROL in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy
constitutes a large and complex task.' On the global level, the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has, for some time now, been
assuming an increasing role in this endeavor2 and is now looking for-
ward to an even wider application of international inspection and veri-
t This article is the outgrowth of a study and on-the-spot survey sponsored by
the American Society of International Law, involving international procedures
and techniques developed to control the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The
author gratefully acknowledges the generous support and counsel obtained from
the Society and its Advisory Group as well as the assistance received through
personal interviews with officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
This article expresses the views of the author.
* Chairman of the Graduate Program of the School of Law and Professor of
Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. J.D., University of Budapest,
1939; LL.M., Yale University, 1950; J.S.D., Yale University, 1952; Ph.D., Yale
University, 1955.
1 For concise, comparative reviews of the various international systems exercis-
ing control over the peaceful uses of atomic energy, see Gorove, Controls over
Atoms-for-Peace: Some Facts and Implications for Nuclear Disarmament, 27
LA. L. REV. 36 (1966); Hall, Atoms For Peace, or War, 43 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
602 (1965); Wolff, The Legal and Factual Problems of International Security
Control in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 4 DIRrrro ED EcONOMIA NUCLEARE 179
(1962).
2 On the enhanced role, perspectives and expectations of the IAEA, see Gorove,
Maintaining Order Through On-Site Inspection, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1525 (1967);
Gorove, Transferring U. S. Bilateral Safeguards to the International Atomic
Energy Agency: the "Umbrella" Agreements, 6 DUQ. U.L. REV. 1 (1967). For
a general discussion of JAEA control procedures, see Szasz, Legal and Admin-
istrative Problems Arising from the Implementation of International Atomic
Energy Safeguards, in PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY 116 (Series X, Law and
Administration, vol. 4, at 116 et seq. 1966).
fication procedures following the conclusion
of the Nonproliferation Treaty.3
One of the major control responsibilities
of the IAEA is to assure that nuclear
materials, facilities and equipment which
have been pledged exclusively for peaceful
purposes will not be diverted to military
uses.4 Perhaps the most frequently encoun-
tered questions in connection with this
assurance relate to enforcement proce-
dures or sanctions and the settlement of
disputes. What happens in the case of non-
compliance by a state with its assumed
pledge not to use certain designated ma-
terials, facilities and equipment for mili-
tary purposes? What if there is some other
noncompliance with accepted control pro-
cedures such as opposition to interna-
tional inspection of a nuclear plant or
facility which by agreement has been
placed under Agency (IAEA) safeguards?
3 Under I of art. VI of the Nonproliferation
Treaty, reproduced in 59 DEP'T STATE BULL. 9
(1968), each nonnuclear weapon state party to
the Treaty undertakes to accept IAEA safe-
guards for the exclusive purpose of verifying
the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under
the Treaty with a view toward preventing diver-
sion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. For analyses of the Treaty provisions
and its implications, see M. WILLRICH, NONPRO-
LIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR
ARMS CONTROL (1969); Bunn, Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 766.
4 The IAEA is charged by its statute to estab-
lish and administer a system of safeguards to
ensure that special fissionable and other mate-
rials, services, equipment, facilities and infor-
mation made available by the Agency or at its
request or under its supervision or control are
not used in such a way as to further any mili-
tary purpose. See INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
STATUTE [hereinafter IAEA Stat., art. III. A. 4].
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Who is liable for violations of individual
or institutional interests such as damage
or injury resulting from an accident oc-
curring in the course of a nuclear inspec-
tion? How are disagreements and disputes
to be handled in the delicate area of
atomic energy where the peaceful and mil-
itary applications are not too far apart?5
The ensuing discussion attempts to give
some answers to these questions. Specifi-
cally, it focuses upon the IAEA sanctions
in case of noncompliance and other en-
croachments upon individual or institu-
tional interests and follows with an
analysis of the Agency's procedures for
settlement of disputes.
NONCOMPLIANCE
Noncompliance, whether or not it in-
volves diversion or other violation of ac-
cepted control procedures, may arise out
of actions by others or by the IAEA itself.6
In the first instance, the statute of the
5 On the problem of differentiating atoms-for-
peace from atoms-for-war, see Gorove, Distin-
guishing "Peaceful" from "Military" Uses of
Atomic Energy: Some Facts and Considerations,
30 OHIO ST. L. J. 495 (1969).
6 Under the Agency's old safeguards system,
incorporated in the Safeguards Document of
1961 (Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/26, 17), "di-
version" was defined as
the use by a recipient State of fissionable or
other materials, facilities or equipment sup-
plied by the Agency so as to further any
military purpose or in violation of any other
condition prescribed in the agreement between
the Agency and the State concerning the use
of such materials, facilities or equipment.
In the revised Safeguards Document of 1965
(Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/66), there is no defini-
tion of diversion but noncompliance would in-
clude any violation of accepted control proce-
dures.
Focus ON THE IAEA
IAEA makes it the primary responsibility
of Agency inspectors to determine the ex-
istence of a violation. 7 The inspectors are
required to report any noncompliance to
the Director General of the Agency who,
in turn, must forward the report to the
IAEA Board of Governors. 8 The Board
exercises a power of review over the find-
ings of the inspectors, since it is required
to call upon the recipient state or states
"to remedy forthwith" any noncompliance
only if it finds that such has occurred. In
that case the Board is also required to re-
port the noncompliance to all members of
the IAEA and to the Security Council and
General Assembly of the United Nations.
The two latter bodies can take whatever
action is open to them under the U. N.
Charter, including the use of force. How-
ever, if corrective action is not taken
within a reasonable time, the Board may
directly curtail or suspend any agency as-
sistance which is being given and call for
the return of materials and equipment
made available to the recipient member.
The return, however, is to be affected by
7 The IAEA is authorized by its statute to send
into the territory of the recipient state or states
inspectors, designated by the Agency after con-
sultation with the state or states concerned,
who shall have access at all times to all places,
data and any person who, by reason of his occu-
pation, deals with materials, equipment, or facil-
ities which are required by the statute to be
safeguarded as necessary to account for source
and special fissionable materials supplied and
fissionable products, and to determine whether
there is compliance with the undertaking against
use in furtherance of any military purpose, and
with any other conditions prescribed in the
agreement between the Agency and the state or
states concerned. IAEA Stat., art. XII.A.6.
8 Id. art. XII.C.
the state or states concerned and the in-
spectors have no right to remove materials
in the event of noncompliance. Addition-
ally, the Agency may suspend any non-
complying member from the exercise of
the privileges and rights of membership.9
Many Agency agreements contain addi-
tional provisions to the effect that, in the
event of failure by the noncomplying state
to take fully corrective action within a rea-
sonable time, the Board may suspend the
Agency's responsibility to apply safeguards
originally agreed upon for a period which
the Board determines is not conducive to
effective application."0
The staff of inspectors also has the stat-
utory responsibility to examine all opera-
tions conducted by the Agency itself in
order to determine, inter alia, whether the
Agency is taking adequate measures to
prevent the source and special fissionable
materials in its custody or used or pro-
9 Id. See also id. art. XII.A.7. During the negoti-
ations relating to the drafting of the IAEA
statute, Poland unsuccessfully proposed that the
Board's decision for the suspension of assistance
and return of materials be made by a two-
thirds majority vote. Docs. IAEA/CS/art. XII/
amend. 3 (1956); IAEA/CS/OR. 38, at 32-35
(1956). It may be noted that art. XII.C. of the
statute uses the phrase "return" of materials,
which implies return to the supplier (IAEA or
a state or states), whereas art. XII.A.7 states
that the Agency is authorized to "withdraw"
any materials. No occasion has yet arisen to dis-
pel this apparent discrepancy, but project or
safeguards agreements normally include refer-
ence to one or the other article.
10 Trilateral Agreement with the Agency, Japan,
and the United States, Sept. 23, 1963, art. II,
§ 14(a), [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1265, T.I.A.S. No. 5429;
Agency Agreement with the United States, June
15, 1964, art. II, § 13(a), [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1456,
T.I.A.S. No. 5621.
duced in its own operations from being
used in furtherance of any military pur-
pose. In case of noncompliance, the
Agency is obligated to take remedial ac-
tion forthwith to correct any failure to
take adequate measures."
VIOLATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS
Since the Agency engages in a number
of activities through its inspectors and
other officials which may result in injury
to individuals or damage to individual or
institutional interests, a brief consideration
of the legal framework of protective sanc-
tions seems appropriate.
Liability for Injury or Damage
In Absence of International Agreement
Generally, in the absence of an inter-
national agreement governing liability, the
Agency and its officials (including inspec-
tors) would be liable for injury or damage
caused by the officials through negligence
or willful misconduct in connection with
their duties. In this respect, it seems con-
venient to distinguish between damage re-
sulting from unauthorized disclosure of
industrial secrets and other confidential
information, and damage or injury arising
from other activities.
A. Unauthorized Disclosure of
Industrial Secrets and Other
Confidential Information
The unauthorized disclosure of indus-
trial secrets and other confidential infor-
mation by an official (inspector) of the
11 IAEA Stat. Art. XII.B.
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Agency who has acquired such information
in the course of his duty may make the
Agency as well as the official liable for
damages to the owner of such information.
The existence and extent of such liability
would depend upon the circumstances of
the disclosure and the nature of damages
suffered. More specifically, it would be
necessary to determine whether the official
knew or had reason to believe that the
information was confidential and whether
the disclosure related to information which
the owner had intended to keep secret or
for which he had intended to acquire a
patent.
The ad hoc committee of the Agency's
inspectors did not include in their docu-
ment any provision concerning the inspec-
tor's obligation not to disclose any in-
dustrial secrets or other confidential
information he might learn by virtue of
his official duties. The committee noted,
however, that such a provision had al-
ready been included in the Safeguards
Document and, furthermore, that all
Agency officials were, in any case, bound
by the statutory stipulations as well as by
the Staff Regulations. 12 Under these vari-
ous restrictions, the Agency staff, which
includes inspectors, is under an obligation
12 Id. art. VII.F; Docs. IAEA/GC(V)/INF/39
(Inspectors Document, 1961); IAEA/INFCIRC/
6. Rev. 1, Staff Regulation 1.06 (1961); IAEA/
INFCIRC/26 at 6 (Safeguards Document,
1961). See also Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/66, 13
(revised Safeguards Document, 1965) and the
relevant provisions of various safeguards agree-
ments. For details on the latter, see Gorove,
Transferring U.S. Bilateral Safeguards to the
International Atomic Energy Agency: The "Um-
brella" Agreements, 6 DUQ. U.L. REV. 1, 12
(1967).
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not to disclose any industrial secret or
other confidential information encountered
due to their position, except to the Di-
rector General and other staff members
authorized to have such information for
the discharge of their official duties.
Agency inspectors are expected to be es-
pecially cognizant of this obligation
because any violation may result in dis-
ciplinary measures against them, including
summary dismissal. Moreover, the Agency
may, in an appropriate case and under
national laws for the protection of profes-
sional secrets, bring suit in the courts of
a member state against the official or ex-
official in order to prevent any unau-
thorized disclosure or to recover damages.
B. Other Activities: Nonnuclear
and Nuclear Incidents
In addition to liability resulting from
unauthorized disclosure of industrial se-
crets and other confidential information,
the Agency and its officials may also incur
liability from other activities, such as the
normal nonnuclear accidents caused by an
inspector or other Agency official at head-
quarters or elsewhere, and nuclear acci-
dents resulting from inspection, test-taking,
measurements, storage, and transportation
of radioactive samples, whenever such
activities are carried out by the inspectors
themselves. Inasmuch as Agency inspec-
tors would normally be instructed to leave
such activities (insofar as this may be pos-
sible without prejudicing the effectiveness
of the inspection) to the staff of the in-
spected facility, and since only small
amounts of nuclear materials would be
involved, these types of accidents would
most likely be of small magnitude.
Liability might also arise in connection
with losses or expenses incurred as a re-
sult of compliance with unreasonable oper-
ational requests by an inspector, such as
a request for an unscheduled inventory
necessitating a shutdown. 13 If a state con-
siders that the demands of an inspector
are unreasonable and that compliance
would involve a substantial expenditure, it
can, at any time, appeal to the Board for
a decision on the matter. This procedure,
and the further possible recourse to any
arbitral or judicial settlement agreed upon,
may, however, be undertaken only by the
respective state and not independently by
the enterprises or the individuals whose
interests are adversely affected, unless the
Agency agrees to such procedure.
Normally, liability would not be ex-
pected to arise in connection with major
operational accidents occurring in an in-
spected facility as a result of compliance
with unreasonable operational orders by
an inspector, since the latter has no au-
thority to make such orders (and this is
usually made known to both the inspector
and the inspected facility), but can only
request that tests or operations be executed
13 This case is not very likely to occur inas-
much as, subject to the requirement that they
effectively discharge their functions, the visits
and activities of Agency inspectors must be so
arranged as to assure the minimum possible
inconvenience to the state and disturbance to
the facilities inspected. Doc. IAEA/GC(V)/
INF/39, 7 & 8 (1961). See also Gorove,
Maintaining Order Through On-Site Inspection:
Focus on the IAEA, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1536,
1565 (1967). The revised Safeguards Document
provides that a request for shutdown may only
be made by the Board's decision. Doc. IAEA/
INFCIRC/66, 1 11 (1965).
by and with the approval of the persons
in charge of the facility who would then
be responsible for the safe execution of
such. 14
Liability Under International Agreement
Under the Agency-sponsored Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Nuclear Dam-
age, which was signed in Vienna on May
21, 1963, liability for nuclear incidents
would fall upon the operator of the facility
where the accident occurred or from which
the nuclear material, if it is of a type
specified in the Convention, was re-
moved. 15 The operator of the facility nor-
mally would have no recourse against the
Agency for damages paid to third parties
and would have a right of recourse against
an inspector personally only if he caused
the accident with specific intent.16
Apart from the Convention, several
Agency agreements contain stipulations
regarding liability. For example, the agree-
ment with Norway stipulates that neither
the Agency nor any person acting on its
behalf is to bear any liability in connec-
tion with the joint program or the reactor
facility and that Norway is to hold them
free from any such liability."
The agreement with the United States
of June 1, 1962 (now expired), provided
that the organization would indemnify the
United States, its officials, agents, em-
ployees, contractors and others claiming
14 Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/66, 48 (1965).
15 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nu-
clear Damage, May 21, 1963, art. IV, 1, IAEA,
Legislative Series No. 4, at 3 (1966).
16 Id. art. IV. 2.
17 Art. IX, § 21. Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/29/
Mod. 1 (1961).
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through it, for any injury or damage
caused by the Agency or its inspectors.
However, it also noted that this provision
did not deprive the Agency or its inspec-
tors of any rights under the U.S. Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, and that the reactoi
facilities were covered by indemnificatior
agreements pursuant to that Act. s
PROCEDURES FOR SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES
Provisions
The IAEA statute envisages a special
procedure for the settlement of disputes.
Under article XVII, any question or dis-
pute concerning the interpretation or ap-
plication of the statute which is not settled
by negotiation is to be referred to the
International Court of Justice unless the
parties concerned agree on another mode
of settlement. While the IAEA may not
be party to a dispute19 before the Inter-
national Court of Justice, the Agency's
General Conference and its Board are sep-
arately empowered, subject to authoriza-
tion from the General Assembly of the
United Nations, to request the Interna-
tional Court of Justice to give an advisory
opinion on any legal question arising
within the Agency's activities. 20
18 Art. VI, § 14 [1962] 1 U.S.T. 415, T.I.A.S.
No. 5002.
19 A genuine dispute between the Agency and a
state is not considered as having arisen unless
the Board or the General Conference is involved
on the Agency's part. Thus, any other disagree-
ment at a lower level (involving only the
Agency's inspectors, its Inspector General, or
its Director General) would not constitute a
genuine dispute.
20 In November 1957, when the General As-
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Furthermore, by the terms of article
XI.F.6. of the statute, appropriate provi-
sions must be included in all IAEA proj-
ect agreements concerning the settlement
of disputes. While this requirement is lim-
ited to project agreements, other types of
safeguards agreements routinely include
such stipulations to the effect that any
dispute with respect to the interpretation
or application of the relevant agreement
which is not settled by negotiation or as
may otherwise be agreed, is, at the request
of either party, to be submitted to an ar-
bitral tribunal. The two parties involved
each designate one arbitrator and the two
arbitrators so named appoint a third, who
acts as the chairman. If, within 30 days
of the request for arbitration, either party
has not designated an arbitrator, either
party to the dispute may request the
President of the International Court of
Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same
procedure applies if, within 30 days of
the designation or appointment of the sec-
ond arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not
been appointed. A majority of the mem-
bers of the arbitral tribunal constitutes a
quorum, and decisions are made by a ma-
jority vote. The procedures of the arbi-
tration are fixed by the tribunal, whose
decisions (including all rulings concerning
procedure, jurisdiction, and division of the
sembly approved the relationship agreement
with the Agency, it also authorized the latter
to request advisory opinions of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice on legal questions aris-
ing within the scope of its activities other than
questions concerning the relationship between
the Agency and the United Nations or any spe-
cialized agency. Docs. IAEA/GC(II)/INF/12
(1958); IAEA/GC/II/39 at 12 (1958); G.A.
Res. 1146, 12 U.N.
expenses of arbitration between the par..'
ties) are binding on all parties. 21
To further develop this subject, the tri-
lateral agreement among the Agency,
Japan, and the United States provides that,
should the dispute involve all three parties
to the agreement, each party designates
one arbitrator and the three will, by unan-
imous agreement, appoint a fourth arbi-
trator, who will be the chairman, plus a
fifth arbitrator. If however, within 30 days
of the request for arbitration, a party has
not designated an arbitrator, either of the
remaining parties can request the Presi-
dent of the International Court of Justice
to appoint an arbitrator. The same pro-
cedure is applied if, within 30 days of the
designation of the three arbitrators, the
chairman or the fifth arbitrator has not
been appointed. 22 There is also a provision
for interim decisions and orders and a
stipulation that all decisions, rulings, and
21 See, e.g., Agency agreements with: the Congo
(Leopoldville, now Kinshasa), art. X, § 12,
Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/37 (1962); Finland, art.
VIII. 1, Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/24 (1960); Nor-
way, art. XI, § 24, Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/Mod.
1 (1961); Pakistan, art. X, § 13, Doc. IAEA/
INFCIRC/34 (1962); United States, June 1,
1962, art. VIII, § 17 (1962) 1 U.S.T. 415,
T.I.A.S. No. 5002; Yugoslavia, art. VII, § 11,
Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/32 (1961); ef. art. V
of the Agency Agreement with Japan, Doc.
IAEA/INFCIRC/3, II (1959), which provides
that the President of the International Court of
Justice shall appoint the third member of the
arbitrational tribunal if the first two members
do not agree on the designation of the third
member within three months after the making
of the application.
22 Article VI, § 20 of the Trilateral Agreement
with the Agency, Japan, and the United States,
Sept. 23, 1963, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1265, T.I.A.S.
No. 5429. For details, see Gorove, supra note
12, at 11.
Irders of the tribunal are to be imple-
mented by the parties in accordance with
their respective constitutional procedures.
23
In case of any dispute involving the ap-
plication of an agreement regarding
Agency inspectors, safeguards against di-
version, or changes in the project, the
decisions of the Board are, if they so pro-
vide, to be given immediate effect by the
respective country, pending the conclusion
of any consultation, negotiation, or arbi-
tration that may be or may have been in-
voked with regard to the dispute. 24
All disputes arising out of the interpre-
tation or application of the Agreement on
the Privileges and Immunities of the
Agency are to be referred to the Inter-
national Court of Justice unless the parties
(states) agree on another mode of settle-
ment. If a difference arises between the
Agency and a member and they do not
agree on any other mode of settlement, a
request is made for an advisory opinion
on any relevant legal question. The opin-
ion given by the court must be accepted
by the parties as decisive. 2
5
23 See art. VI, § 20; Agency Agreement with
the United States, June 15, 1964, art. VI, § 18
[1964] 2 U.S.T. 1456, T.I.A.S. No. 5621. For
details, see Gorove, supra note 12, at 11.
24 See cited Agency agreements, notes 21 & 22,
supra, with: the Congo, art. X, § 13; Pakistan,
art. X, § 14; ef. cited Agency agreements with:
Finland, art. VIII, 2; Japan and the United
States, art. VI, § 21; Norway, art. XI, § 25;
United States, June 1, 1962, art. VIII, § 18;
United States, June 15, 1964, art. VI, § 19;
Yugoslavia, art. VII, § 12.
25 Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities
of the IAEA, art. X, § 34, Doc. IAEA/
INFCIRC/9/ Rev. 1 (1959). For details, see
Gorove, Privileges and Immunities of Interna-
tional Atomic Inspectors, 38 FORDHAM L. REV.
497 (1970).
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Disputes and Procedure
Against the Agency
If a state decides that it has a claim
against the Agency based on any action
or omission of an Agency official (inspec-
tor), it can demand reparation from the
organization and, if unsuccessful, then in-
voke the procedure for settlement of dis-
putes provided in the relevant agreement.
When any other party (such as the op-
erator of an inspected facility, if such is
not the state itself, or any other third
party not contractually related to the
Agency) presents a claim against the
Agency which the latter is not prepared
to satisfy directly, the organization can
require the claimant to advance it through
his state. The Agency could also waive its
own immunity in the appropriate national
court or propose some ad hoc method of
adjudicating its liability, such as by arbi-
tration.26
While the Agency may seek reimburse-
ment from the inspector concerned, in
most cases it could not expect to have any
major damages covered in this way. There-
fore the Agency normally carries insurance
to cover itself for the inspector's activities.
26 The Agency does not have an internal tri-
bunal like the one established by the Security
Control Convention of December 20, 1957 of
the Organization for European Economic Coop-
eration (now known as the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development). See
Gorove, The Inspection and Control System of
the European Nuclear Energy Agency, 7 VA. J.
INT'L L. 68, 82 (1967). It may also be noted
that the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tri-
bunal of the International Labor Organization
(ILO) is limited to disputes brought by ILO
officials. See Statute of the Administrative Tri-
bunal of the ILO, art. II, 4 & 5.
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Disputes and Procedure Against
the Inspected State
If Agency property is damaged during
the course of an inspection, the Agency
may advance its claim against the state
or the facility in which the damage oc-
curred. If the claim is not settled by nego-
tiation, the Agency may resort to the
disputes procedure provided for in the
relevant agreement.
If an Agency inspector suffers injury in
the course of an inspection, he may bring
a claim against the state or the facility in
which the injury occurred. If he is unable
to obtain satisfactory compensation, he
may, in addition to obtaining the compen-
sation due him for injuries incurred in the
course of service, request the Agency .to
espouse his claim. The Agency, acting in
its own behalf or on behalf of its inspector,
may, if necessary, invoke the disputes stip-
ulations incorporated into the appropriate
agreement.27
ASSESSMENT
The preceding analysis of IAEA sanc-
tions and the procedures for the settle-
ment of disputes lends itself to a number
27 The Ad Hoc Committee on the Agency's
Inspectors decided to omit a provision from the
Inspectors Document which would have re-
quired a state to warn Agency inspectors of any
danger of radiation or radioactive contamina-
tion that might be encountered during their
inspections. The Committee felt that such a pro-
vision would raise difficult questions of possible
state liability to the Agency or its inspectors,
and should consequently not be dealt with in
the Inspectors Document. However, the Com-
mittee recommended that the parties concerned
should include appropriate provisions on this
subject in the project and safeguards agree-
ments.
of observations. The IAEA, like other
international organizations, has extremely
limited authority to deal with noncompli-
ance. Having no physical force at its dis-
posal to support its authority, it must
necessarily rely upon the cooperation of
the member states to assure observance of
statutory obligations. When faced with a
clear-cut diversion or other substantial vio-
lation, the most it can do is request the
return of the materials and equipment
from the noncomplying recipient state and
report the violation to the United Nations,
an organization proven to be largely in-
effective as an instrument for the legiti-
mate use of force. In view of these
considerations, one may wonder how the
IAEA could have expected to accomplish,
and indeed could have accomplished, its
functions without major disputes or sig-
nificant incidents of noncompliance which,
according to all indications, appears to
be the case. The reason seems to lie first
of all in the fact that IAEA safeguards
apply only to certain designated materials,
facilities and equipment which have been
voluntarily earmarked for peaceful pur-
poses, and do not apply to atoms destined
for military use, such as nuclear weapons.
Thus the benefits, if any, to be gained from
diversion would be negligible inasmuch as
countries may have their own military
programs not subject to IAEA controls.
A more formidable test for the effective-
ness of Agency sanctions may come with
the eventual policing of the Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty and the Treaty for the Prohi-
bition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America.28
28 Under art. I of the Treaty for the Prohibi-
While these agreements are not intended
to prevent nuclear weapons states from
increasing their stockpiles of atomic arms,
they aim to prevent the acquisition or
manufacture of atomic weapons by non-
nuclear weapons states. Thus, once the
nonnuclear weapons states adhere to these
treaties and accept the application of
JAEA safeguards to all of their nuclear
materials, equipment, and facilities, the
subsequent temptation for diversion may
assume significant dimension, especially if
countries are involved in a major armed
conflict or face a serious military con-
frontation.
The final test, however, of the JAEA
provisions for the application of sanctions
tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (also
known as the Tlatelolco Treaty) Feb. 14, 1967,
reproduced in 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 521
(1967), the contracting parties undertake to use
the nuclear materials and facilities, which are
under their jurisdiction, exclusively for peaceful
purposes, and to prohibit and prevent in their
respective territories:
(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production
or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any
nuclear weapons, by the parties themselves, di-
rectly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else
or in any other way; and
(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deploy-
ment and any form of possession of any nu-
clear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the
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and the settlement of disputes would come
only as a result of the direct application
of Agency safeguards to atomic military
stockpiles of nuclear weapons states in an
agreement on disarmament or the reduc-
tion or control of armaments. If such a
situation eventually develops, it is expected
that any nuclear weapons state will insist
upon additional safeguards and sanctions
commensurate with the degree of effect that
diversion by another state would have on
its military posture. and overall security.
At that time, if the IAEA is to assume
major control responsibilities, its proce-
dures will have to be backed up by an
effective world organization with full au-
thority and actual ability to use force, if
necessary, against a recalcitrant state.
parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf
or in any other way.
The contracting parties also undertake to re-
frain from engaging in, encouraging or au-
thorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way
participating in the testing, use, manufacture,
production, possession or control of any nuclear
weapon.
Under art. 13 of the same Treaty the parties
also undertake to negotiate multilateral or bi-
lateral agreements with the IAEA for the ap-
plication of its safeguards to their nuclear
activities. For a general discussion of the Treaty
provisions, see G. ROBLES, EL TRATADO DE
TLATELOLCO (1968). See also Robinson, The
Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 282 (1970).
